The Tests of Illegality under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by Akman, P
	



	





	

	
				
 

!∀#∃%&∋ (	
)∗	+!	∋&∋∋&,−!			
.	# ∋%∋(/0∋&)112&&&30 &34
		5

∗∋&∋∋66&&&3 &34∋7 7∋&6


	8	

				

1 
 
THE TESTS OF ILLEGALITY UNDER ARTICLES 101 AND 102 TFEU 
Professor 3Õnar Akman 
[forthcoming in (2016) Antitrust Bulletin] 
INTRODUCTION 
The two-volume ECONOMICS AND THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S. AND E.U. 
ANTITRUST LAW by Richard Markovits is without doubt one of the most impressive academic 
commentaries on US and EU Antitrust Law. It goes well beyond the usual superficial 
comparison of US and EU antitrust laws and together with its forthcoming policy-sequel THE 
WELFARE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY AND U.S. AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAW: A SECOND-
BEST-THEORY-BASED ECONOMIC-EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS will constitute a monumental 
research study on US and EU antitrust law and policy. It demonstrates levels of analytical 
thinking seldom found in textual analysis of antitrust laws. It is indeed one of the few studies 
of antitrust law that goes beyond the provisions and case law in order to establish coherent 
principles that operationalise the law.  
The aim of the current article is to assess one of the many contributions of the study to our 
understanding of US and EU antitrust laws, namely the tests of illegality adopted in ECONOMICS 
AND THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S. AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAW to interpret 
Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as well 
as the claim that none of these tests is an economic-inefficiency test of illegality. In order to do 
this, this article first comments on the ³specific-anticompetitive-intent test´ that Markovits 
proposes to be the test of illegality under the object branch of the prohibition of Article 101 
and under the abuse prohibition of Article 102 TFEU before moving onto separate discussions 
of the tests of illegality in the specific contexts of Article 101 TFEU and subsequently of Article 
102 TFEU. Finally, the article offers some concluding thoughts.   
THE SPECIFIC-ANTICOMPETITIVE-INTENT TEST 
According to Markovits, many antitrust economists, often influenced by misguided legal 
scholars, assume that US and EU antitrust laws promulgate an economic-inefficiency test of 
illegality.1 In contrast, according to Markovits, the test of illegality that the Sherman Act 
                                            
1
 ECONOMICS AND THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S. AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAW, Vol I (hereinafter 
MARKOVITS I) at xxviii (Springer, 2014). According to Markovits, ibid., many experts also assume that increases 
in competition always tend to increase economic efficiency as a result of their ignoring the General Theory of 
Second Best. 
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promulgates and that Markovits believes also to be the test for the object branch of Article 101 
TFEU and for the exclusionary-abuse branch of Article 102 TFEU is the ³specific-
anticompetitive-intent test´2 Under this test, a seller commits an anticompetitive act if and only 
if its ex ante SHUFHSWLRQRILWVFKRLFH¶VSURILWDELOLW\ZDVceteris paribus critically affected by its 
belief that the conduct might benefit the seller by increasing the demand curve that it would 
face in future by reducing the absolute attractiveness of the offers against which it would have 
to compete.3 According to Markovits, such acts have to be committed with the ³specific intent´ 
to reduce the absolute attractiveness of the offers against which the undertaking will have to 
compete±that is, they are acts that would not have been committed but for WKHSHUSHWUDWRU¶V
belief that they would or might have this effect, in circumstances in which the effect in question 
would ceteris paribus critically inflate the profitability of the acts concerned.4  
Several general points can be made in relation to the specific anticompetitive intent test. First, 
the introduction of the reduction in the aWWUDFWLYHQHVVRIULYDOV¶RIIHUVDVDFHQWUDOFRPSRQHQW
of what makes a practice anticompetitive is highly valuable and attractive: it provides an 
essential conceptual basis for establishing what makes any given conduct anticompetitive. Such 
clear, conceptual bases are seldom found in academic or practitioner commentaries on antitrust, 
or even in the case law on issues concerning what exactly makes any given conduct 
anticompetitive. It is an attractive proposition to understand acts that distort or harm 
FRPSHWLWLRQ DV WKRVH E\ ZKLFK RQH XQGHUWDNLQJ UHGXFHV WKH DWWUDFWLYHQHVV RI LWV ULYDOV¶
competing offers which would not be profitable for the perpetrator but for this reduction in the 
attractiveness of rivalV¶RIIHUVSuch a conceptualisation provides one with a principled basis 
XVLQJ ZKLFK RQH FDQ GLVWLQJXLVK EHWZHHQ DJJUHVVLYH FRPPHUFLDO SUDFWLFHV WKDW KDUP RQH¶V
ULYDOVRQWKHPHULWVDQGDQWLFRPSHWLWLYHSUDFWLFHVWKDWKDUPRQH¶VULYDOVE\DGLVWRUWLRQRIWKe 
competitive positions of the perpetrator and its rivals. Second, the use of ³intent´ as part of the 
test of anticompetitiveness is not uncontroversial in the US or in the EU. There is indeed a 
sharp divide amongst commentators regarding the use of intent particularly in unilateral 
conduct cases (i.e., cases that would fall within the scope of Sherman Act Section 2 or Article 
102 TFEU).5 This section will discuss the use of intent in the context of Article 102 TFEU. 
                                            
2
 MARKOVITS I at 69. 
3Id. 
4Id. at 69-70.  
5
 PÕQDU Akman, The Role of Intent in the EU Case Law on Abuse of Dominance 39 EUROPEAN L. REV. 316, 318 
(2014). For a related discussion is what exactly ³intent´ refers to in this context, and particularly whether it refers 
to objective or subjective intent, see, e.g., Ronald A. Cass and Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 SO.CAL.L. 
REV. 657 (2001), distinguishing between subjective and objective intent. Cf. RENATO NAZZINI, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION LAW: THE OBJECTIVE AND PRINCIPLES OF ARTICLE 102 at 58 
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The discussion of intent in the context of Article 101 TFEU is left for the next section since 
Article 101 TFEU explicitly prohibits practices with the ³object´ to restrict, distort or prevent 
competition, and the role of intent under Article 101 TFEU has to be considered in this specific 
context alongside the discussion of practices with the ³effect´ to restrict, distort or prevent 
competition as an alternative to practices with the ³object´ to do so.  
Concerning the use of intent in unilateral conduct cases, whereas some authors have argued 
that the intent of the undertaking evidenced by, for example, the language used in internal 
documents should be irrelevant for the competition inquiry,6 other commentators suggest that 
anticompetitive intent can be a proxy for anticompetitive effects, since the firm itself is in the 
best position to know the effects of its conduct.7 Interestingly, some jurisdictions in fact require 
their competition authority to prove intent (usually understood as the ³purpose´ of the act) as 
a legal element of the general test of anticompetitiveness for unilateral conduct.8 In the context 
of Article 102 TFEU, the current author argued elsewhere that there is no role for intent in the 
EU prohibition of abuse of dominance for several reasons some of which will be discussed 
immediately below.9  
First, according to the ultimate arbiter of EU law, namely the Court of Justice (CoJ), ³abuse´ 
is an ³objective concept´ relating to the behaviour of a dominant undertaking which is such as 
to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of that undertaking, 
the degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from 
                                            
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), arguing that ³objective intent´ defined as such is a test of effect and not intent, and 
in any case, any subjective intent test is always also objective since the ³intent´ to cause competitive harm must 
be complemented with acts that are objectively capable of causing the harm in question to be found abusive. 
6
 See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne and E. Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs vs. Cold Economics: The Use and Misuse 
of Business Documents in Antitrust Enforcement and Adjudication, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 609 (2005); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO STATE L. J. 1035 (2000); Antonio Bavasso, The Role of Intent 
XQGHU $UWLFOH  (& )URP ³)OXVKLQJ WKH 7XUNH\V´ WR ³6SRWWLQJ /LRQHVVHV LQ 5HJHQW 3DUN,´ EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION L. REV. 616 (2005). 
7
 Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization Analysis, 54 AMER. UNIV. L. REV. 151, 
157 (2004). See also Eirik Osterud IDENTIFYING EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES BY DOMINANT UNDERTAKINGS UNDER 
EU COMPETITION LAW: THE SPECTRUM OF TESTS at Ch. 5 (Kluwer Law International, 2010) for intent-based tests 
of abuse. Similarly, it has been argued that intent evidence can be very helpful when defendants are not primarily 
PRWLYDWHGE\SURILWVDQGREMHFWLYHO\GHWHUPLQLQJWKHUHOHYDQWUHVWUDLQW¶VZHOIDUHHIIHFWVLVGLIILFXOW0aurice E. 
Stucke, Is Intent Relevant? J. OF LAW, ECON.& POLICY 801, 831 (2012). 
8
 Turkey and Canada are two examples. In Turkey, the provision regulating the abuse of a dominant position 
prohibits, inter alia, practices that aim at complicating the activities of competitors in the market²see Act No 
4054 on the Protection of Competition, Article 6. In Canada, although not required in the legislation, the Federal 
Court of Appeal has found that an anticompetitive act is to be defined by reference to its purpose, and the required 
anticompetitive purpose is an intended negative effect on a competitor that is predatory, exclusionary, or 
disciplinary²see Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Canada Pipe Co., 2006 FCA 233, [66]. For further 
information, see Competition Bureau Canada Enforcement Guidelines on The Abuse of Dominance Provisions 
10 et seq. (2012). 
9
 See Akman, supra note 5. 
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those which condition normal competition, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the 
degree of remaining competition or the growth of that competition.10 This definition suggests 
that a subjective element such as intent has no role to play in the assessment of whether the 
conduct is anticompetitive. Nevertheless, a closer look DWWKH&RXUW¶VRZQMXULVSUXGHQFHindeed 
reveals that the concept of abuse might not be as ³objective´ as the CoJ suggests: there are 
cases across different types of abusive conduct in which the intent of the dominant undertaking 
was found to be relevant.11 In fact, some decisions of the European Commission and judgments 
of the European Courts (General Court and the CoJ) refer to the ³object´ or ³purpose´ of the 
dominant undertaking as an alternative to analysing the ³effects´ of a practice on the market, 
and these cases appear to use ³intent´ and ³object´ synonymously.12 One problem with such 
usage is that using (subjective) intent to find a practice anticompetitive, sometimes to the extent 
of disregarding evidence of lack of effects, poses serious risks for legal certainty.13 Using intent 
is particularly problematic under an effects-based approach: such usage begs the question why 
intent matters if its role is not to act as proxy for effects.14 Yet, if the concern is indeed with 
the effects of conduct on the market, then what the added value of establishing intent is as 
opposed to directly establishing the existence or lack of effects on the market is unclear.15 
Moreover, the question also remains even where the conduct of an (dominant) undertaking 
cannot be explained by anything other than the intention to eliminate competitors, why this 
should matter so long as competitive harm (in the form of effects on the market) cannot be 
demonstrated.16 In turn, if competitive harm can be demonstrated, intent becomes superfluous 
since the proof of anticompetitive effects should suffice for a finding of abuse regardless of the 
benign intentions of the perpetrator.17 The opposite is also true: where the objective market 
factors in themselves do not demonstrate the existence of abuse, what the dominant undertaking 
intended should be irrelevant since doubt should benefit the accused and if there is not a 
                                            
10
 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v. EC Commission, ECR 461, [91] (1979). 
11
 See Akman, supra note 5 at 316-317. Intent is explicitly relevant for the test of predation when the price is 
between Average Variable Cost (AVC) and Average Total Cost (ATC)²see Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v. 
EC Commission, ECR I-3359, [72] (1991). Intent is also specifically relevant for the test of vexatious litigation²
see Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia NV v. EC Commission, ECR II-2937, [60]; [55] (1998). The relevance of intent 
for other types of abusive conduct is, in contrast, implicit in the decisional practice and case law. 
12
 See Akman, supra note 5 at 317. Some examples of using intent terminology interchangeably with ³object´ 
and/or ³purpose´ can be found in Commission Decision (Case COMP/A.37.507/F3) AstraZeneca OJ L332/24, 
[327]; [628]; [632]; [648]; [763] (2006); AKZO, supra note 11 at [71]; Case C-202/07 P France Télécom v. EC 
Commission, ECR I-2369, [107], [110] (2009). For further discussion and examples from case law, see Akman, 
supra note 5 at 334 et seq. 
13
 Id. at 317. 
14
 Id. at 331. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id.  
17
 Id.  
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credible theory of harm that can be explained on the basis of objective market factors going 
beyond what the undertaking allegedly intended, there must be doubt.18 Thus, intent is 
superfluous in this scenario as well.  
Under the EU case law on Article 102 TFEU, once intent is equated with object, this means 
that in the presence of intent (which is sufficiently established by subjective intent in the case 
law) the absence of effects can be disregarded in the finding of abuse because the jurisprudence 
does not require proof of effects to establish abuse.19 Thus, potentially, abuse can be established 
on the basis of intent (which in turn can be established on the basis of internal documents) 
without having to demonstrate even likely effects if current case law is followed. Crucially, the 
EU decisional practice and case law lack a fundamental element contained in the test of 
illegality proposed by Markovits, which makes it particularly problematic to use intent in the 
EU given the current formalistic approach of the authorities. This problem may not pose a 
danger were the EU approach to change to involve this additional element of the test proposed 
by Markovits. This additional element relates to efficiency and will be discussed next.  
Notwithstanding the fact that Markovits suggests that the relevant tests of illegality that he 
argues to be correct as a matter of law are not based on economic inefficiency, the tests still 
contain an important element of economic efficiency. Particularly for those better informed on 
the case law and discussions concerning EU antitrust law than US antitrust law, it is important 
to elaborate on the proposition that the correct tests of illegality are not based on economic 
inefficiency. What follows and the role that efficiency plays in the EU case law further explain 
why making intent a central factor in establishing anticompetitive conduct for the EU antitrust 
provisions might be less desirable than doing so in US law.  
                                            
18
 Id. For the principle of doubt benefitting the accused in the competition context, see, e.g., Case C-457/10 P 
AstraZeneca v. EC Commission, ECR 0000, [199] (2012).   
19
 There are cases in which anticompetitive object or potential restrictive effects were deemed sufficient to prove 
an abuse²see, e.g., Case T-203/01 Michelin v. Commission (Michelin II) ECR II-4071, [239] (2003); Case T-
219/99 British Airways plc v. Commission  ECR II-5917, [293] (2003); Commission Decision of 21 May 2003 
relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579 ² Deutsche 
Telekom AG) [2003] OJ L263/9, [179]-[180]. There are also several cases where the effects of a practice were 
not deemed relevant such as Michelin II and Irish Sugar where the GC held that, for the purposes of applying 
Art.102, establishing anti-competitive object and anti-competitive effect are one and the same thing; Michelin II, 
ibid [241]; Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar plc v. Commission ECR II-2969, [170] (1999). Although recently in Case 
C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet ECR I-0000, [24] (2012) the CoJ appeared to require effects to 
the detriment of consumers for Article 102 to be infringed, in a more recent judgment, namely AstraZeneca the 
same court clearly reiterated its earlier position that the required effect is a potential anticompetitive effect, not 
necessarily concrete or ³current and certain anticompetitive effects´; AstraZeneca, supra note 18 at [112]. For 
cases that equate intent with object, see note 12 supra. 
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For Markovits, under the proposed test of illegality, profits resulting from a given choice are 
³inflated´ if they exceed WKDWFKRLFH¶V economic efficiency and they are ³critically inflated´ if 
the relevant profit-inflation caused the choice to be profitable despite the fact that it is 
economically inefficient.20 The profits that the choice yields are ³ceteris paribus critically 
inflated´ LI QRWKLQJ HOVH H[LVWV WKDW PLJKW FDXVH WKH SURILWV WR GLYHUJH IURP WKH FKRLFH¶V
economic efficiency.21 Thus, Markovits appears to suggest that an anticompetitive act involves 
DILUPPDNLQJDFKRLFHWKDWUHVXOWVLQSURILWVH[FHHGLQJWKDWFKRLFH¶VHFRQRPLFefficiency where 
this increase in profits renders the choice profitable even though the choice is not otherwise 
economically efficient and there is no other factor that would render such an economically 
inefficient choice profitable than the reduction in tKHDWWUDFWLYHQHVVRI WKH ULYDO¶VRIIHULQJV
Moreover, the firm in making that choice does so believing that this would be the outcome as 
DUHVXOWRIWKHUHGXFWLRQLWVFKRLFHZLOOOHDGWRLQWKHDWWUDFWLYHQHVVRILWVULYDOV¶RIIHULQJVThus, 
there is a clear, discernible element of efficiency in the centre of this test even though it is not 
the inefficiency of conduct (i.e., the reduction in efficiency) that renders the conduct illegal.  
Incorporating a distinct element testing the efficiency of conduct for the undertaking adopting 
the conduct into the legal test of anticompetitiveness represents a significantly different 
approach to the EU approach in which efficiency is only a secondary concern±if taken into 
account at all. This is because particularly under Article 102 TFEU that the conduct increases 
efficiency can only be argued and has to be proved as a defence by the perpetrator.22 Thus, 
efficiency is not taken into account in the proof of abuse itself and thus, is not included in the 
test of what makes conduct anticompetitive despite arguments to this effect in the literature.23 
Consequently, if the defendant fails to prove to the requisite standard that the efficiency 
enhancing aspects of its conduct outweighs the distortive effects on competition (and that 
consumers will benefit from the efficiency gains), it can be found to have abused its position 
                                            
20
 MARKOVITS I at 70. 
21
 Id. at 70. 
22
 6HH*XLGDQFHRQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V(QIRUFHPHQW3ULRULWLHVLQ$SSO\LQJ$UWLFOHRIWKH(&7UHDW\WR$EXVLYH
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (hereinafter EC Abuse Guidance) [2009] OJ C45/7, [28]-[31]. 
23
 See, e.g., 3ÕQDU Akman, Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82EC, 29 OXFORD J. OF LEG. STUD. 267, 
288-289 (2009); Denis Waelbroeck, The Assessment of Efficiencies under Article 102 TFEU and the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V*XLGDQFH3DSHUin COMPETITION LAW AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLE 102 at 103 (FEDERICO 
ETRO AND IOANNIS KOKKORIS, eds.) (Oxford Univ. Press, 2010); PINAR AKMAN, THE CONCEPT OF ABUSE IN EU 
COMPETITION LAW: LAW AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES 282-283 and 316 et seq. (Hart Pub. Co., 2012).  Part of 
the problem with accepting efficiencies to be an ³objective justification´ and therefore a defence is that, as 
expressed by Advocate General Jacobs in Syfait, the two-stage analysis suggested by the distinction between 
³abuse´ and ³objective justification´ is somewhat artificial: the more accurate view is that ³certain types of 
conduct on the part of a dominant undertaking do not fall within the category of abuse at all´²see AG Jacobs 
Opinion in Case 53/03 Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) and Others v. 
GlaxoSmithKline AEVE ECR I-4609, [72] (2005). 
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without the claimant or the court ever having to establish whether the conduct increases the 
efficiency of the perpetrator.24 Similarly, under Article 101 TFEU, efficiency can only be taken 
into account under Article 101(3) TFEU as one of the four criteria that would ³H[FHSW´(prior 
to Regulation 1/2003, ³exempt´) a given practice from breaching Article 101 TFEU despite 
falling foul of the prohibition found in Article 101(1) TFEU. The burden of proof is similarly 
on the defendant to prove that the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU are met.25 Failing such 
proof, conduct can be found to breach Article 101 TFEU without the claimant or the court ever 
having to establish whether the conduct increases efficiency or not. Thus, under the standard 
(8DSSURDFKZKHWKHUWKHSHUSHWUDWRU¶VFRQGXFWZRXOGEHHIILFLHQWDQGSURILWDEOHLUUHVSHFWLYH
RIWKHHIIHFWRQWKHDWWUDFWLYHQHVVRIULYDOV¶RIIHUVLVQRWWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW save for as a defence 
by the perpetrator. In this respect, the test proposed by Markovits is far more receptive to the 
possibility that increasing efficiency may prevent a given conduct from breaching antitrust law 
than the current EU approach and the treatment of efficiency thereunder. This important 
difference needs to be borne in mind in order to appreciate the concern of European 
commentators regarding the assessment of efficiency by the EU authorities,26 as well as to 
appreciate the implications of accepting the test proposed by Markovits as the correct test of 
illegality under the EU provisions. Consequently, accepting the test of illegality as proposed 
by Markovits might actually imply for the EU authorities to adopt a more efficiency-based 
approach than is currently the case, notwithstanding the proposition that the test itself is not 
one based on economic inefficiency. 
THE TEST OF ILLEGALITY UNDER ARTICLE 101 TFEU 
Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits, as incompatible with the internal market, all agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices that 
may affect trade between Member States and that have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. Article 101(2) TFEU then 
lists particular types of prohibited conduct before Article 101(3) TFEU exempts conduct that 
falls foul of Article 101(1) TFEU but satisfies four specific criteria found in Article 101(3) 
                                            
24
 )RUWKH&R-¶VKROGLQJWKDWFRQVXPHUVPXVWEHQHILWIURPWKHHIILFLHQFLHVVHH&DVH&-95/04 British Airways v. 
Commission ECR I-2331, [86] (2007). 
25
 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1, Article 2. 
26
 See, e.g., ROBERT 2¶'ONOGHUE AND JORGE PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 102 TFEU 286 
et seq. (2nd ed.)  (Hart Pub. Co., 2013); Jean-François Bellis and Tim Kasten, Will Efficiencies Play an 
Increasingly Important Role in the Assessment of Conduct under Article 102 TFEU? in COMPETITION LAW AND 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLE 102 at 129 (FEDERICO ETRO AND IOANNIS KOKKORIS, eds.) (Oxford Univ. Press, 
2010); see also sources in note 23 supra. 
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TFEU. On Article 101 TFEU, Markovits argues that the provision promulgates tests of prima 
facie illegality. In this context, Markovits first notes that it is not correct to separate the test of 
³preventing or restricting competition´ from the concept of ³conduct that has preventing or 
restricting competition as its object or effect.´27 This is to be contrasted with the argument that 
Markovits notes to be adopted by several EU antitrust experts in interpreting the rule such that 
(i) conduct should be said to prevent or restrict competition whenever it inflicts a net-Euro loss 
on the customers of its perpetrators and the customers of their rivals, regardless of the 
SHUSHWUDWRUV¶ PRWLYH IRU engaging in the conduct and regardless of the way in which that 
outcome is generated, and (ii) this interpretation should control the interpretation of ³conduct 
that has as its object or effect the prevention or restriction of competition´28 The alternative 
test of illegality that Markovits puts forward is that conduct should be deemed to have as its 
³object´ the prevention or restriction of competition only if LW PDQLIHVWV WKH SHUSHWUDWRUV¶
specific anticompetitive intent and that conduct should be deemed to have as its ³effect´ the 
prevention of restriction of competition only if it would impose a net-equivalent-monetary loss 
on the customers of the perpetrators and the customers of their product rivals combined by 
reducing the absolute attractiveness of the best offer they respectively receive from any inferior 
supplier LI LW ZRXOG QRW EHQHILW WKRVH EX\HUV E\ LQFUHDVLQJ WKH SHUSHWUDWRUV¶ RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶
proficiency.29 Thus, Markovits interprets the effect branch of the prohibition of Article 101 
TFEU to prohibit conduct that would inflict a loss on relevant buyers by reducing the absolute 
attractiveness of the best offer they respectively receive from any inferior supplier if the 
perpetrators would take full advantage of the reductions their conduct generated in the 
attractiveness of the best offer that relevant buyers received from any inferior supplier and the 
conduct would not generate any relevant efficiencies.30 Thus, for conduct to breach Article 101 
TFEU by having the effect of preventing, restricting, or distorting competition, it must be the 
case that it would impose a loss on the buyers of the relevant product by reducing the 
attractiveness of the offers of the second-placed suppliers if it did not generate any efficiencies 
for the perpetrators.  
As for the interpretation of ³object,´ Markovits notes that ³their object´ in Article 101(1) TFEU 
could refer to ³an object´ or to ³a critical object´ (i.e., an object that critically affected the 
SHUSHWUDWRUV¶ GHFLsion to engage in the relevant type of conduct covered by Article 101(1) 
                                            
27
 MARKOVITS I at 113. 
28
 Id.  
29
 Id. 
30
 Id.at 117.  
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TFEU).31 Under the first interpretation, Article 101 TFEU would render prima facie illegal any 
FRQGXFWWKDWZDVPRWLYDWHGDWDOOE\WKHSHUSHWUDWRU¶VZLVKWRSUHYHQWUHVWULFWFRPSHWLWLRQHYHQ
if they would have engaged in the conduct in question had they not perceived ex ante that it 
would/might prevent/restrict competition.32 Thus, this interpretation relies on the motivation of 
the perpetrators in establishing the scope of the provision. Under the second interpretation, 
which is the one favoured by Markovits, Article 101 TFEU would render prima facie illegal 
conduct that violates the SheUPDQ$FW¶VVSHFLILF-anticompetitive-intent test of illegality²i.e., 
FRQGXFW ZKRVH SHUSHWUDWRUV¶ ex ante perceived profitability was critically affected by their 
belief that it would/might secure the object of restricting/preventing competition in some way 
that would render conduct profitable though economically inefficient in an otherwise-Pareto-
perfect economy.33 Since this proposition is also based on the belief of the perpetrators, the 
factor that distinguishes this interpretation from the former is the addition of the element of 
whether the perpetrators would have engaged in the conduct but for the prevention/restriction 
of competition that would render an otherwise inefficient conduct profitable. Thus, in 
0DUNRYLWV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKHREMHFWEUDQFKRIArticle 101 TFEU¶VWHVWRILOOHJDOLW\DGGVWRWKH
effect branch of that test by rendering prima facie illegal conduct that was ill-motivated even 
if it did not succeed in preventing or restricting competition.34 These interpretations imply that 
(i) conduct WKDW LPSRVHV D ORVV RQ UHOHYDQW EX\HUV EXW GRHV QRW PDQLIHVW WKH SHUSHWUDWRUV¶
specific anticompetitive intent would not violate the object branch of the test of illegality under 
Article 101 TFEU even if the buyers did suffer a loss and that (ii) conduct that imposes a loss 
on relevant buyers because it prevents the perpetrators from erroneously charging them 
unprofitably low prices, enables them to prevent their independent distributors from charging 
prices lower than those that would maximise the profits of the products and distributors, or 
enables the perpetrators to profit by using ³fancy pricing techniques´ to extract buyer surplus 
do not violate the effect branch of the test of illegality under Article 101 TFEU.35  
According to Markovits, the interpretation of the EU antitrust experts provided above 
concerning the test of illegality under Article 101 TFEU36 is based on the argument that the 
7UHDW\¶VFRPSHWLWLRQODZSURYLVLRQVPDQLIHVWSUR-consumer distributive preferences as 
demonstrated by both the fact that Article 101(3) TFEU exempts economic-efficiency-
                                            
31
 Id.  
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. at 119. 
35
 Id. at 113.  
36
 See text to which note 28 supra is attached.  
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generating conduct that breaches Article 101(1) TFEU¶VWHVWRIprima facie illegality only if 
consumers secure a fair share of the benefit generated by the conduct and by the fact that Article 
102 TFEU prohibits dominant firms from abusing their positions not only by exclusionary but 
also by exploitative conduct.37 6HFRQGWKH(8H[SHUWV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQLV arguably based on the 
argument that the prohibition in Article 101(1)(e) TFEU of making the conclusion of contracts 
subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature 
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts, 
displays the assumption of the 7UHDW\¶V GUDIWHUV WKDt tie-ins, RPM agreements, vertical 
territorial restraints, etc. prevent or restrict competition in the Article 101(1) TFEU sense of 
that expression even when they do not reduce inter-brand competition.38  
Markovits argues that the first interpretation fails on two grounds. The first is that some of the 
ways in which conduct can harm customers cannot be attributed to its preventing or restricting 
competition even if the concept involved intra-brand competition as well as inter-brand 
competition.39  This must indeed be correct. The current author would also argue that conduct 
must entail more than harming customers to make it anticompetitive under Article 101 TFEU. 
As argued elsewhere, the competition rules of the Treaty are not rules of ³consumer protection 
law.´40 This is supported by historical research that demonstrates that the drafters of the original 
Treaty did not use the term ³consumer´ in the technical sense of that term to refer to final 
customers.41 The other reason Markovits provides is that his interpretation is not incompatible 
with the distributive preferences the Treaty manifests. The current author would indeed take 
this further and argue that the Treaty does not necessarily manifest distributive preferences, at 
least in favour of ³consumers´ due to the meaning given to that term in the original Treaty, and 
due to the lack of consumer protection rules therein.42 In any case, according to Markovits, his 
interpretation would not be incompatible with any distributive preferences of the Treaty 
because the Treaty drafters appear to think that firms with dominant positions have special 
obligations to their customers, and there is an important difference between profiting by better 
                                            
37
 MARKOVITS I at 114. 
38
 Id.  
39
 Id.  The examples provided include mergers that enable the merged firm to increase prices as a result of 
discovering that they had been underestimating their profit-maximising price; tie-ins or reciprocity agreements 
that impose a loss on customers without altering the absolute attractiveness of the offers against which the sellers 
have to compete by allowing the seller to profit by extracting surplus from the buyers that would have been 
otherwise unprofitable for the seller to extract.  
40
 See PINAR AKMAN, THE CONCEPT OF ABUSE IN EU COMPETITION LAW: LAW AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES 
307-308 (Hart Pub. Co., 2012). 
41
 See 3ÕQDU$NPDQSearching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82 EC, 29 OXFORD J. OF LEG. STUD. 297 (2009).   
42
 See PINAR AKMAN, THE CONCEPT OF ABUSE IN EU COMPETITION LAW: LAW AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES  
101-102 (Hart Pub. Co., 2012).  
11 
 
utilisation of competitive advantages secured through skill, industry, etc. and profiting by 
committing acts with the specific intent of reducing competition the undertaking faces or 
SURILWLQJDWFXVWRPHUV¶H[SHQVHE\FRPPLWWLQJDFWVWKDWWKHXQGHUWDNLQJNnows will reduce the 
competition it faces even if the same act would have been committed anyway.43  
Regarding the second interpretation found in the (8H[SHUWV¶DUJXPHQW provided above (that 
Article 101(1)(e) TFEU implies that practices that reduce intra-brand competition, as opposed 
to inter-brand competition, are prima facie illegal under Article 101 TFEU¶VWHVWRILOOHJDOLW\), 
44
 Markovits is not convinced for several reasons. Some of these reasons are that (i) this 
interpretation is not inconsistent with 0DUNRYLWV¶SURSRVHGWHVWRILOOHJDOLW\WRWKHH[WHQWWKDW
practices reducing intra-brand competition as per Article 101(1)(e) TFEU sometimes also 
reduce inter-brand competition45 and that (ii) Markovits is not convinced that the 
drafters/ratifiers of the original Treaty or even of its amended versions appreciated the 
difference between distributive and economic-efficiency effects of conduct that reduces intra-
brand competition as opposed to reducing inter-brand competition.46 Markovits suggests that 
the freedom-based approach to Article 101(1)(e) TFEU, which protects the freedom of business 
people that the conduct falling under Article 101(1)(e) TFEU constrains even where only intra-
brand competition is reduced, is ill-conceived: such businesspeople accept those constraints 
exercising their free will and the assumption that they have a true freedom interest in making 
those choices that contractual clauses falling foul of Article 101(1)(e) TFEU prohibit is 
incorrect.47 Moreover, Markovits argues that prohibitions of the contract clauses under Article 
101(1)(e) TFEU will lead businesses to adopt other lawful conduct that is at least as restrictive 
as the clauses covered under (e) and that efforts to promote inter-state trade by using (e) to 
prohibit intra-brand competition are likely to be counterproductive because businesspeople are 
likely to respond to them by integrating forward into distribution, increasing prices in poorer 
Member States, or stopping selling in these Member States.48 All in all, Markovits rejects the 
interpretation that Article 101 TFEU¶VWHVWRIprima facie illegality covers conduct that reduces 
intra-brand competition without reducing inter-brand competition.49  
                                            
43
 MARKOVITS I at 115. 
44
 See text at note 28 supra.  
45
 MARKOVITS I at 115. 
46
 Id. at 115-116. 
47
 Id. at 116. 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. at  117. 
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The interpretation of Article 101(1)(e) TFEU by Markovits is certainly an interesting one. First, 
Markovits appears to suggest that the prohibition of intra-brand restrictions is incorrectly 
established to be found in Article 101(1)(e) TFEU. Second, Markovits also appears to argue 
that de lege ferenda restrictions of intra-brand competition should not be covered by the 
prohibition of Article 101 TFEU if they do not also comprise restrictions of inter-brand 
competition. Third, de lege lata restrictions of intra-brand competition are not covered by the 
prohibition of Article 101 TFEU if they do not also comprise restrictions of inter-brand 
competition.50 Regarding the first argument, it should be noted that the list of practices in 
Article 101 TFEU is not exhaustive51 and, even if it were exhaustive, at least some (if not, 
many) vertical restraints can be deemed to fall under Article 101(1)(a) TFEU¶VSURKLELWLRQRI 
directly or indirectly fixing purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; as well 
as Article 101(1)(c) TFEU¶VSURKLELWLRQRIVKDUing markets or sources of supply. Thus, the 
argument proposed by Markovits that intra-brand restrictions are not covered by Article 101 
TFEU goes much further than the interpretation of Article 101(1)(e) TFEU as such. 
Interestingly, this third point raised by Markovits concerning whether de lege lata Article 101 
TFEU covers vertical, intra-brand restrictions of competition or whether it is limited to 
horizontal, inter-brand restrictions of competition was an issue that had to be resolved by the 
CoJ. In the seminal case of Consten and Grundig, the Court had to adopt a decision to clarify 
that Article 101 TFEU does indeed apply to vertical restraints.52 This suggests that originally 
conceived it was at least ambiguous whether Article 101 TFEU would apply to these restraints 
at all, which supports the position adopted by Markovits.53 Finally, regarding the second point 
raised concerning whether Article 101 TFEU should be interpreted to cover intra-brand 
restraints, the criticism of the freedom-based approach by Markovits is indeed compelling. A 
study of the entire case law of the EU courts by the current author spanning over fifty years 
revealed that the concept of ³freedom´ indeed plays a role in the case law, albeit perhaps not 
as significant as one might think.54 The problems that Markovits identifies with the freedom-
                                            
50
 Markovits also argues that intra-brand restrictions should not be deemed to violate the Sherman Act either; See 
MARKOVITS I at 83 et seq. 
51
 For the holding that the list in Article 101(1) applies to all types of collusion, whatever form it takes, see, e.g., 
Case C-49/92P Commission of the European Communities v. Anic Partecipazioni SpA [1999] ECR I-4125, [108] 
(1999). 
52
 Case 56 and 58/64 Etablissements Consten SA and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission ECR 299, 339 
(1966). 
53
 Interestingly, the Italian Government as well as the German Government as interveners in Consten and Grundig 
appear to have respectively argued that Article 101 is not applicable to vertical agreements or inter-brand 
restrictions of competition if intra-brand competition is not restricted²see  Consten and Grundig, supra note 52 
at 308-309; 325. 
54
 6HH3ÕQDUAkman, 7KH5ROHRI³)UHHGRP´LQ(8&RPSHWLWLRQ/DZ, 34 Legal Studies 183 (2014). 
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based approach are undoubtedly correct. Yet, it is also undoubtedly correct that²as 
acknowledged by Markovits²the EU Commission and courts have been driven by the concern 
to integrate the markets within the EU by taking a very strict stance towards conduct that 
hampers parallel imports and thereby threatens the integration of the markets. What is 
nRWHZRUWK\ LV WKDW0DUNRYLWV¶DUJXPHQW WKDWVXFKSURKLELWLRQVZLOORQO\ OHDG WREXVLQHVVHV¶ 
adopting similar clauses that are lawful but at least as restrictive/ or choosing to vertically 
integrate or even to potentially stop selling in certain Member States is compelling in 
establishing the position that, even with the market integration motive, the prohibition of intra-
brand restrictions under Article 101 TFEU may not be justified. Having said that, it must also 
be pointed out that restrictions of intra-brand competition are not categorically exempted under 
other antitrust laws than that of the EU where market integration is not necessarily a concern, 
most notably under US antitrust law. It should be noted that Markovits indeed argues that 
restrictions of intra-brand competition that do not also constitute restrictions of inter-brand 
competition should not be deemed anticompetitive under US antitrust law either.55 
Comments on the test of illegality under Article 101 TFEU 
Several points can be made in response to the test of illegality proposed to be correct under 
Article 101 TFEU by Markovits whilst also noting some of the implications of this test. The 
first point concerns the interpretation of ³object´ under Article 101 TFEU by the EU Courts 
and how that fares against the test of illegality proposed by Markovits, which is based on 
specific anticompetitive intent. The assessment of ³object´ under Article 101 TFEU by the EU 
Courts usually involves an assessment of the practice (agreement, concerted practice, etc.) 
having regard to the content of its provisions, the objectives that it seeks to ascertain and the 
legal and economic context of which it forms part.56 As will be further discussed below, this 
line of case law suggests that the perpetrators¶ motive is neither critical nor determinative for 
the decision whether the conduct can be categorised as an object restriction. This implies that 
the specific anticompetitive intent test may not be able to rationalise the EU courts¶ thus-far 
application of the prohibition of object under Article 101 TFEU and accepting it to be the 
correct test of illegality would cause some difficulty in terms of consistency within the case 
                                            
55
 MARKOVITS I at 83-86. 
56
 See, e.g., Joined Cases 96/82 to 102/82, 104/82, 105/82, 108/82 and 110/82 IAZ International Belgium and 
Others v. Commission ECR 3369, [25] (1983); Case C-209/07 Beef Industry Development Society and Barry 
Brothers ECR I-8637, [16], [21] (2008); C-501/06 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission ECR I-
9291, [58] (2009). 
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law.57 Recently, the CoJ has also noted that restrictions can be considered to be by object where 
they have the potential to have a negative impact on competition, having regard to the specific 
legal and economic context,58 and in order to establish such likelihood, the court should take 
into consideration the structure of the market, the existence of alternative distribution channels, 
their importance, the market power of the companies concerned, etc.59 Admittedly and indeed 
as has been noted in the literature, such an expansive interpretation of the object branch of 
Article 101 TFEU is not only rather ³worryingly broad and vague´ but also blurs the distinction 
between the object and effect branches of Article 101 TFEU due to its ambiguity as to how 
much market analysis is required before a conclusion can be reached that the practice is 
restrictive by object and before a full effects-analysis must be conducted.60 This position is 
aggravated by the fact that, since the object branch of Article 101 TFEU does not require any 
analysis of the effects of the practice, the category of object restrictions should be defined 
narrowly.61 Indeed, Markovits argues that the EU courts and officials have been unclear about 
the meaning of the object versus effect distinction in the same way that the US authorities and 
courts have obfuscated the relevant issues.62  
The second comment that can be made on the test of illegality is that the interpretation by 
Markovits shifts the focus of the assessment of the effect-branch of the prohibition of Article 
101 TFEU to the effect of the conduct on customers DQGULYDOV¶FXVWRPHUV. This is interesting 
not least because Article 101 TFEU covers horizontal as well as vertical anticompetitive 
agreements and similar conduct. The interpretation provided by Markovits focuses on the 
effects on customers even for horizontal restrictions since such restrictions may also be 
examined as restrictions by effect. Thus, the focus on effects on customers excludes any 
concern for the effects on competitors not party to the agreement, concerted practice, etc. as 
well as those potential competitors that might be prevented from entering the market as a result 
of such practices. Although the effect on the former (i.e., the competitors outside the practice) 
may not be significant in terms of establishing anticompetitiveness (because these might be 
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 Having said that, it should also be noted that there is no rule of precedent in the EU, so legally there is nothing 
to prevent the courts from changing their interpretation of the test of illegality under Article 101 TFEU. On the 
lack of rule of precedent, see Anthony Arnull, Owning up to Fallibility: Precedent and the Court of Justice, 30 
CMLR 247, 248, 262 (1993); ALISON JONES AND BRENDA SUFRIN, EU COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS (hereinafter JONES AND SUFRIN) 231 (5th ed.) (Oxford Univ. Press, 2014). 
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 Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit  ECR 
I-4529, [31] (2009). 
59
 Case C-32/11 Allianz Hungária Biztosító Zrt. and Others v. Gazdasági Versenyhivatal  ECR I-0000, [48] 
(2013). 
60
 JONES AND SUFRIN at 212-213. 
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 Id. at 213. 
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benefiting from umbrella effects), the effects on potential competitors may be significant. 
Indeed, in Delimitis the CoJ noted that while establishing whether the agreement restricts 
competition by effect, two cumulative conditions must be met:63 first, it must be determined 
whether having regard to the economic and legal context of the agreement in question, it is 
difficult for competitors who could enter the market or increase their market share to gain 
access to the relevant market; and second, where there is a network of similar agreements on 
the market, the agreement in question must make a significant contribution to the sealing-off 
effect brought about by the totality of those agreements in their economic and legal context. 
Thus, although ultimately the main concern might indeed be the effects on customers, there 
might be circumstances in which the effects on potential competition might also be relevant in 
establishing a restriction by effect under Article 101 TFEU, particularly (but not limited to 
cases) where there is a network of similar agreements on the same market.64   
A third comment that can be made on the test of illegality noted to be correct by Markovits 
under Article 101 TFEU is that the specific anticompetitive test somewhat renders the ³object´ 
branch of Article 101 TFEU ³subjective´ because the criterion for the existence of object 
becomes the existence or lack of specific intent on the part of the perpetrators. Whether the 
existence of ³object´ under Article 101 TFEU can be established on the basis of subjective 
intent is indeed an area of debate in EU antitrust commentary. One commentator has argued 
that the ³object´ criterion in Article 101 TFEU can be satisfied by a demonstration of 
³subjective intention´65 Odudu suggests that this ³subjective intention´ is actually objectively 
determined on the basis of external manifestations, such as circumstantial evidence.66 The 
suggestion appears to be the use of a test akin to the ³reasonable person´ test and ask whether 
a reasonable third person situated as the defendant would have acted in the way the defendant 
acted without the intention imputed to her.67 Thus, the question is what the ³actions show about 
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 Case C-234/89 Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG ECR I-0935, [27] (1991). 
64
 The importance of potential competition was also mentioned in Case T-374/94 European Night Services Ltd 
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(Oxford Univ. Press, 2011) for the argument that a test that looks at the objective tendency of the conduct of a 
dominant firm to achieve a certain purpose is not a test of intent but a test of effect. 
67
 Okeoghene Odudu, Interpreting Article 81(1), 26 EUROPEAN L. REV. 60, 70 (2001).  
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the state of mind´68 Such an interpretation would presumably be in line with the test proposed 
by Markovits. On the other hand, other commentators argue that ³object´ under Article 101 
TFEU does not refer to subjective intention but rather to the objective meaning and purpose of 
the agreement considered in the economic context in which it is to be applied.69 Thus, it has 
been noted that a subjective intent to restrict competition by object or to infringe Article 101 
TFEU is not a necessary condition for violating Article 101 TFEU despite the fact that, where 
an intent to restrict competition can be found, this may be relevant for determining that the 
restriction is by object.70 In the same vein, the lack of an intention to restrict competition and 
to infringe Article 101 TFEU will not deprive an agreement of anticompetitive object either.71 
There is also jurisprudence from the EU courts that rejects the position that the lack of an 
anticompetitive purpose or intent should immunise conduct from breaching Article 101 
TFEU.72 With reference to this EU case law that interprets object as not the subjective intention 
of the parties but the objective meaning and purpose of the agreement, Markovits finds this 
distinction ³clearly obscure and probably incoherent´ because the ³objective meaning and 
purposes of the agreement´ cannot be equated with its ³effect´73 Although, as noted above, 
there is indeed a problem with the case law that has increasingly blurred the distinction between 
restrictions by object and by effect by expanding the actual market analysis involved in 
establishing an anticompetitive ³object´ following an expansive interpretation of ³object´ as 
the potential or capability or likelihood to restrict competition,74 this problem can also be 
alleviated by adopting a more restrictive interpretation of object that involves neither any 
market analysis nor any subjective element of intent. This could be achieved by reserving the 
category of restrictions by object only for those clear-cut practices such as hard-core cartel 
agreements that experience as well as economics demonstrate to be practically always harmful 
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 Id. at 70 and note 60.  
69
 RICHARD WHISH AND DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 118-119 (7th ed.) (Oxford Univ. Press, 2012). 
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to the functioning of competition irrespective of market context.75 Arguably, this might have 
been the intention in the first place behind having object and effect as alternative bases for the 
competition law assessment that should take place under Article 101 TFEU. The more 
elaborate the assessment of ³object´ restrictions, the more ambiguous the distinction between 
object and effect restrictions²this may indeed be an aspect of EU competition law for which 
a formalistic approach is more desirable than an effects-based approach since, by definition of 
the Treaty provision, restrictions by object are posed as alternatives to restrictions by effect, 
and an ³effects-based approach´ is logically not suitable for the categorisation of restrictions 
as ³object´ restrictions. 
THE TEST OF ILLEGALITY UNDER ARTICLE 102 TFEU 
According to Markovits, monopolising conduct is considered to be bad both because it is 
presumptively economically inefficient and because, from any plausible conception of 
distributive justice, it is unfair.76 Thus, monopolising conduct is economically inefficient (i) 
because it would be unprofitable but for its tendency to reduce the absolute attractiveness of 
the offers against which the perpetrator must compete and (ii) because its tendency to reduce 
the absolute attractiveneVV RI ULYDOV¶ FRPSHWLQJ RIIHUV ZLOO JHQHUDOO\ UHGXFH HFRQRPLF
efficiency at the same time as it yields the perpetrators profits.77 Moreover, the reason such 
conduct is distributively unjust is that (i) it rewards the perpetrator for conduct that is 
economically inefficient and has no other redeeming consequence and (ii) it imposes losses on 
WKHSHUSHWUDWRU¶VFXVWRPHUVLQFDVHRISUHGDWLRQ, on the targets of the perpetrator) for no good 
reason at all.78 This understanding of monopolising conduct implies that conduct should not be 
characterised as monopolising if its perpetrator believed ex ante that it would be at least 
normally profitable by enabling the perpetrator to (i) make its own product more attractive 
and/or reduce its costs; (ii) take better advantage of a given demand/marginal cost combination, 
(iii) secure a tax benefit, and/or (iv) liquidate assets on terms that were not critically affected 
by any tendency that the sale had to reduce the absolute attractiveness of competing offers of 
rivals.79 Consequently, conduct that can be deemed to be monopolising include practices such 
as ³contrived oligopolistic conduct´80 whose ex ante profitability perceived by its perpetrator 
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is critically affected by its deterring rivals from making as attractive offers to the SHUSHWUDWRU¶V 
customers as they would have otherwise made and predatory conduct, whose ex ante 
profitability perceived by its perpetrator is critically affected by its driving a rival out, etc.81 
)LQDOO\0DUNRYLWVGHILQHVH[FOXVLRQDU\FRQGXFW DVFRQGXFW WKDWPDQLIHVWV WKHSHUSHWUDWRU¶V
specific anticompetitive intent.82 Markovits argues that this is how US courts, enforcement 
agencies and scholars have implicitly defined the concept although there are some cases in 
which conduct was found to have foreclosed (or would foreclose) competition when it did not 
manifest specific anticompetitive intent but would induce exit or deter entry without rendering 
WKHSHUSHWUDWRU¶VEXVLQHVVPRUHHIILFLHQWWKDQWKe business of the foreclosed rivals.83 All in all, 
according to Markovits, the test of illegality under Article 102 TFEU is the same as the test of 
illegality under the object branch of Article 101 TFEU. 
Regarding the test of illegality argued to be correct by Markovits for the application of Article 
102 TFEU, several points have already been made concerning the ³specific- anticompetitive-
intent test´ above.84 Although it is attractive to adopt²at least conceptually²the same test of 
illegality under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the potential problems with using intent as the 
central concept of such a test explained above are arguably more significant in the case of 
Article 102 TFEU than in the case of Article 101 TFEU. This is because, in the context of 
Article 102 TFEU, the conduct at issue is unilateral and therefore involves no mental element 
that makes it objectionable in and of itself in contrast to prohibited practices under Article 101 
TFEU where the mental state of parties having, for example, agreed to distort, reduce or 
prevent competition might matter. Moreover, the costs of a Type-I error that might result from 
the inability of an enforcement agency or court to distinguish the intent to win competition 
from the intent to distort competition are possibly higher and/or more important due to the 
potential adverse effect on investment and innovation incentives of the undertaking under 
scrutiny. Furthermore, unlike the US Sherman Act Section 2, there is no prohibition of 
attempted abuse (or monopolisation) under Article 102 TFEU, which further supports the 
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position that analytically there is no need or place for the intent of the dominant undertaking to 
be taken into account.85  
In its Guidance on enforcement priorities under Article 102 TFEU, the Commission noted that 
the aim of its enforcement in applying Article 102 TFEU to exclusionary conduct is ³to ensure 
that dominant undertakings do not impair effective competition by foreclosing their 
competitors in an anti-competitive way, thus having an adverse impact on consumer welfare, 
whether in the form of higher price levels than would have otherwise prevailed or in some other 
form such as limiting quality or reducing consumer choice´86 The Commission will normally 
intervene under Article 102 TFEU when, on the basis of cogent and convincing evidence, the 
conduct is likely to lead to anticompetitive foreclosure.87 In turn, ³anticompetitive foreclosure´ 
describes a situation in which effective access of actual or potential competitors to the market 
is hampered or eliminated due to the conduct of the dominant undertaking whereby the 
undertaking is in a position to profitably increase prices to the detriment of consumers.88 This 
author has argued elsewhere that the way the Commission expresses its enforcement aim by 
stating that the concern is to ensure that dominant undertakings do not impair effective 
competition by foreclosing rivals in an anticompetitive way and thus having an adverse impact 
on consumer welfare is equivocal.89 This is because it is unclear whether the ³adverse impact 
on consumer welfare´ is an assumed/expected consequence of ³foreclosing rivals in an 
anticompetitive way´ in which case ³anticompetitive´ would not be tantamount to the ³adverse 
impact on consumer welfare´90 Then, one would need a separate definition and proof of 
³anticompetitive´ which the Guidance does not provide.91  
Regarding so-called ³price±based exclusionary conduct,´ the Commission will normally only 
intervene to prevent anticompetitive foreclosure when the conduct concerned has already been 
or is capable of hampering competition from competitors that are considered to be as efficient 
as the dominant undertaking.92 It is not clear why this so-called ³as efficient competitor´ test 
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is limited to price-based exclusionary conduct and what the general test is for non-price-based 
exclusionary conduct in the Guidance. In any case, it must be noted that in the appeal of Intel 
the General Court clearly and explicitly rejected this to be the test of abuse under Article 102 
TFEU by holding that the as efficient competitor test is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
proving an abuse.93 Moreover, there are doubts that the Commission itself in practice adopts a 
standard taking into account efficiencies.94  
:KDW LV QRWHZRUWK\ UHJDUGLQJ 0DUNRYLWV¶ conceptualisation of monopolising conduct and 
foreclosing conduct is that²even though he does not deem these to rely on tests of illegality 
based on inefficiency²as discussed above, there is an important element of efficiency built 
into the tests establishing the existence of such conduct.95 This element makes the test proposed 
by Markovits much more attractive than the as efficient competitor test as adopted by the 
Commission (with the caveat relating to the use of intent as discussed above96). This is because, 
XQGHUWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VDVHIILFLHQWFRPSHWLWRUVWDQGDUG, the test of whether conduct is abusive 
depends on whether conduct would exclude competitors that are as efficient as the dominant 
undertaking.97 Whether or not the conduct enhances the efficiency of the dominant undertaking 
is not part of the test; it is a defence that has to be proven by the dominant undertaking to 
practically rebut the finding of abuse that will have been established on the basis of the potential 
effects of conduct on the viability of the competitors on the market that are as efficient as the 
undertaking under scrutiny.98 The current author has argued elsewhere that the correct test for 
abuse should instead be one that establishes exclusion and exploitation as well as a lack of 
LQFUHDVHLQ WKHGRPLQDQWXQGHUWDNLQJ¶VHIILFLHQF\99 In such a test, the fact that the conduct 
leads to a non-trivial increase in the dominant uQGHUWDNLQJ¶VRZQHIILFLHQF\(in comparison to 
a situation in which the dominant undertaking either did not adopt the conduct under 
investigation or adopted the conduct that would be the alternative to the investigated conduct) 
would be part of establishing abuse as opposed to proving a defence to an allegation of abuse. 
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The reasoning behind this is that, LIWKHXQGHUWDNLQJ¶VFRQGXFWVHUYHVWKHSXUSRVHRILQFUHDVLQJ
its own efficiency, it should be deemed as a legitimate business practice²even if it excludes 
competition and exploits customers.100 Ultimately, this condition serves to distinguish normal 
commercial practices from objectionable ones and is a natural consequence of the definition of 
abuse this author has supported elsewhere as conduct that would not be possible but for the 
dominance of the undertaking.101 Such a definition means that abusive practices are those by 
which the dominant undertaking is able to advantage itself to the disadvantage of its trading 
partners in a manner that would not be possible in competitive conditions.102  
In some respects, this understanding of abuse is quite close to that offered by Markovits albeit 
expressed in different words: they both aim to catch those practices by which the dominant 
XQGHUWDNLQJDGYDQWDJHVLWVHOIWRWKHGLVDGYDQWDJHRIULYDOV0DUNRYLWV¶GHILQLWLRQRUWUDGLQJ
SDUWQHUVFXUUHQWDXWKRU¶VGHILQLWLRQ,Q0DUNRYLWV¶GHILQLWLRQWKHWHVW relates to reducing the 
DWWUDFWLYHQHVV RI WKH ULYDOV¶ RIIHUV ZLWKRXW LQFUHDVLQJ RQH¶V own efficiency. In the current 
DXWKRU¶VSUHIHUUHGGHILQLWLRQ, it relates to disadvantaging trading partners without increasing 
RQH¶VRZQHIILFLHQF\7KHUHDVRQIRUUHIHUULQJWRWUDGLQJSDUWQHUVDVRSSRVHGWRULYDOVLVWKDWDV
originally intended and as demonstrated by the types of prohibited conduct, Article 102 TFEU 
only concerns exploitative conduct aimed at trading partners/customers and not rivals.103 If one 
DGRSWVWKHFXUUHQWDXWKRU¶Vpreferred definition, then one needs to find a separate element of 
³harm to competition´ to operationalise Article 102 TFEU as a modern antitrust rule (as 
opposed to, for example, a trade or consumer protection rule). This author finds this separate 
element in Protocol 27 (annexed to the Treaty on the European Union [TEU] and TFEU), which 
states that the internal market as set out in Article 3 TEU ³includes a system ensuring that 
competition is not distorted.´104 7KHDGYDQWDJHRI0DUNRYLWV¶GHILQLWLRQLVWKDWLQLWRQHILQGV
both the element of harm to competition (by the rHGXFWLRQLQWKHDWWUDFWLYHQHVVRIULYDOV¶RIIHUV
DQGWKHHOHPHQWRIKDUPWRFXVWRPHUVFRQVXPHUVWKHUHGXFWLRQLQWKHDWWUDFWLYHQHVVRIULYDOV¶
offers imposes losses on customers since it is ultimately a reduction in the attractiveness of 
their second-best choice of product). The difficulty with adopting this definition to be the 
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correct definition of abuse under Article 102 TFEU would be the lack of textual support 
concerning the effect on rivals and the possibility of the effects on the attractiveness of ULYDOV¶
offers being misinterpreted in enforcement practice and confusing the protection of competitors 
with that of competition. The lack of textual support may be alleviated by the fact that the EU 
courts have adopted a teleological approach.105 The danger of confusing the reduction in the 
DWWUDFWLYHQHVVRIULYDOV¶RIIHUVZLWKSURWHFWLQJFRPSHWLWRUVIRUWKHVDNHRIGRLQJVRLVFOHDUO\DQ
issue with the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU and not an issue with the text of Article 102 
TFEU itself or with the test of illegality provided by Markovits. 
Types of conduct DQGµFRPSHWLWLRQRQWKHPHULWV¶ 
Markovits notes that Article 102 TFEU prohibits conduct that it covers when the conduct is 
either an ³exploitative´ or an ³exclusionary´ abuse.106 Although this is commonly accepted in 
the literature and in the case law of the EU Courts, it is noteworthy that such a distinction is 
not found in the provision of Article 102 TFEU itself where all the examples of abuse concern 
exploitation. In fact, historical research into the travaux préparatoires of the negotiations of 
the Treaties of Rome examined by the current author suggests that the provision was intended 
to apply to only exploitative conduct.107 According to Markovits, the list in Article 102 TFEU 
makes it clear that an exploitative abuse takes place when prices are unfairly high, customers 
are made subject to unfairly-disadvantageous terms, unfairly low prices are paid to suppliers, 
or production, markets, technical development are limited in ways that impose a net-
equivalent-monetary loss on customers.108 Markovits interestingly makes the point that it 
would also be a prohibited type of exploitative abuse for the dominant undertaking not to make 
a QV (quality or variety increasing) investment or an investment in plant-modernisation or 
new-plant construction when the failure to do so unfairly disadvantages customers.109 There 
are indeed a few cases that deal with the inefficiency of dominant undertakings as a type of 
abusive conduct. These cases have usually²but not always²related to statutory monopolies 
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carrying out their business inefficiently, without adopting new technology, etc.110 Despite the 
dearth of case law on the issue, inefficiency of an undertaking can indeed be an abuse provided 
that, for example, it causes prejudice to trading partners by limiting production, markets or 
technical development. Prohibition of such exploitation would be sanctioning the ³quiet 
monopoly life´ and thus the productive inefficiency of the dominant undertaking.111 What is 
questionable and what might be missing in terms of a breach of Article 102 TFEU is whether 
the mere inefficiency of the undertaking could/should be an abuse without proof of separate 
harm to competition²for example, without separate proof of exclusion.112 The current author 
has argued elsewhere that at a principle level, without such separate harm to competition, the 
mere inefficiency of a dominant undertaking should not be found abusive under Article 102 
TFEU.113 
Markovits identifies several deficiencies in the way the EU Commission and courts have 
interpreted Article 102 TFEU.114 These include, first, the fact that the authorities have never 
sufficiently defined the concept of an ³exclusionary´ abuse of dominance.115 It can indeed 
fairly be said that they have never done this for exploitative abuse either²that is, have never 
set out the parameters that make conduct exploitatively abusive. Second, Markovits suggests 
that the authorities have been inconsistent concerning their statements about whether 
competition on the merits could ever constitute an exclusionary abuse.116 According to 
Markovits, ³competition on the merits´ cannot be an exploitative abuse of a dominant position 
because such competition involves behaviour whose ex ante perpetrator-perceived profitability 
is not critically affected by WKH SHUSHWUDWRU¶V perception that the conduct would reduce the 
absolute attractiveness of the best offers against which the perpetrator would have to compete 
by deterring a rival from competing, forcing a rival RXW RU GHWHUULQJ D ULYDO¶V 49
investments.117 Consequently, such competition cannot violate a specific-anticompetitive-test 
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of illegality. Similarly, regarding the relation between exclusionary conduct and competition 
on the merits, Markovits notes that, in US antitrust law, conduct is said to be ³exclusionary´ or 
to ³foreclose´ competition if and only if LWPDQLIHVWVWKHSHUSHWUDWRU¶VVSHFLILFDQWLFRPSHWLWLYH
intent (which, according to Markovits, means that it does not constitute competition on the 
merits).118 Further, according to Markovits, ³[b]ecause EC antitrust officials and scholars tend 
to borrow U.S. antitrust language and analyses, it is appropriate to assume that as an initial 
matter that they define the terms µexclusionary¶ and µforeclose¶ in the same way that U.S. 
officials do´119 This author would respectfully disagree with this statement for two reasons: 
first, it is debatable whether the EU officials and scholars borrow US language and analyses 
because on occasions it almost appears to be the opposite²the EU authorities almost strive to 
distinguish their approach from that of the US authorities. For example, in the recent process 
of encouraging private actions, in its Directive on Damages Actions the EU Commission has 
practically rejected the adoption of all the rules and mechanisms that are associated with US 
private antitrust actions.120 This is demonstrated by first, displaying the aim of private actions 
to be compensation rather than deterrence; rejecting treble damages; rejecting limitations of 
LQGLUHFWSXUFKDVHUV¶VWDQGLQJ and allowing for the passing on defence, etc.121 Second, and more 
importantly, the provisions of US and EU antitrust laws are significantly different from one 
another in ways that make any potential borrowing or inspiration rather limited. For example, 
monopolisation or attempted monopolisation is not prohibited under EU law; exploitative 
abuse of dominance is not prohibited under US law; the single market imperative forces the 
EU authorities to adopt approaches to practices such as vertical restraints that differ from those 
in the US; the lack of strong private enforcement in the EU and the different institutional set 
up (i.e., courts versus administrative agencies) require different types of analyses and 
approaches in handling cases. In fact, the difference in the approach adopted, particularly 
concerning the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU and Sherman Act Section 2, has occasionally 
led to very different outcomes in practically identical disputes on the two sides of the 
Atlantic.122 
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Indeed, Markovits notes that various statements of the EU officials indicate that they are not 
defining ³exclusionary´ and ³foreclose´ in the same way US authorities do.123 Moreover, the 
(8 DXWKRULWLHV¶ SRVLWLRQ RQ WKH HIIiciency defence to Article 102 TFEU also implies that 
competition on the merits can constitute exclusionary abuse.124 This is because, unlike the 
6KHUPDQ$FW¶VVSHFLILFDQWLFRPSHWLWLYHLQWHQWWHVWDQGWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQDO-economic-efficiency-
defence that can be read into Clayton Act, the efficiency defence that has been read into Article 
102 TFEU exonerates dominant firms whose competition on the merits has reduced 
FRPSHWLWLRQRUSUHYHQWHGLQFUHDVHVLQFRPSHWLWLRQE\LPSURYLQJWKHGRPLQDQWXQGHUWDNLQJ¶V
operational economic efficiency if and only if the net effect of the efficiency-enhancing conduct 
is to create an on-balance equivalent-monetary gain for the customers of the dominant 
undertaking or of its rivals.125 Thus, conduct that on balance harms customers cannot be 
justified on efficiency grounds, meaning±according to Markovits±that competition on the 
merits can be abusive.126  
It has indeed been noted by commentators that efficiencies should be incorporated into the 
definition of abuse under Article 102 TFEU.127 This is, however, not the approach adopted by 
the EU authorities. According to the Commission, efficiency is only one type of defence and 
the dominant undertaking has to demonstrate that the conduct under investigation produces 
substantial efficiencies that outweigh any anticompetitive effects on consumers.128 This is a 
reflection of the CoJ judgment in British Airways according to which efficiencies can only be 
taken into account as an objective justification if the exclusionary effect arising from the 
conduct that is disadvantageous for competition may be counterbalanced or outweighed by 
advantages in terms of efficiency that also benefit the consumer.129 Moreover, according to the 
Guidance RQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VHQIRUFHPHQWSULRULWLHV, ³the Commission will assess whether 
the conduct in question is indispensable and proportionate to the goal allegedly pursued by the 
dominant undertaking.´130 Yet, the Commission never explains what the counterfactual is for 
this assessment: the Guidance is silent as to the alternative situation with which the comparison 
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ZLOO EH PDGH IRU WKH GRPLQDQW XQGHUWDNLQJ¶V FRQGXFW WR EH IRXQG LQGLVSHQVDEOH and 
(dis)proportionate.131 Further, to prove an efficiency defence, the dominant undertaking has to 
demonstrate that the efficiencies are sufficient to guarantee that no net harm to consumers is 
likely to arise.132 One problem with this is that the Commission thereby requires the dominant 
undertaking to guarantee that no net harm to consumers is likely to arise due to the 
efficiencies,133 when the Commission itself only proves likely anticompetitive foreclosure.134 
Consequently, in cases in which the Commission does not prove effects on consumers or actual 
foreclosure to find abuse (i.e., does not establish the harm to consumers), the undertaking has 
the burden to rebut a position that the Commission has not actually proven in its allegation 
and/or finding of abuse.135 ,Q VXFK FDVHV WKH XQGHUWDNLQJ¶V GXW\ LV FORVHU WR HVWDEOLVKLQJ
whether or not conduct is abusive ± the burden of proving which is on the Commission²than 
providing a ³defence´ to a sufficiently established allegation of abuse.136 An additional 
problem is that the requirement that the dominant undertaking demonstrates that there will be 
no net harm to consumers begs the question of what the counterfactual is with which the 
comparison is to be made to decide whether there is net harm or not.137 The counterfactual 
could be the scenario in which the dominant undertaking does not engage in the practice in 
question or it could be the scenario in which the dominant undertaking engages in the 
practice(s) alternative to the investigated conduct.138 The Guidance does not indicate which 
scenario is the relevant one and the handling of efficiencies in the Guidance remains incomplete 
for practical and conceptual purposes.139 
:KDW0DUNRYLWV¶ DUJXPHQW DOVR UHYHDOV LV WKDW WKH(8DXWKRULWies have never meaningfully 
defined what ³competition on the merits´ involves despite using this concept as an apparent 
benchmark. For example, DFFRUGLQJWRWKH*XLGDQFHWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VHQIRUFHPHQWDFWLYLW\
regarding exclusionary abuse is focussed on ³safeguarding the competitive process in the 
internal market and ensuring that undertakings which hold a dominant position do not exclude 
their competitors by other means than competing on the merits of the products or services they 
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provide´140 Yet, the Guidance does not define ³competition on the merits´ Neither do the 
judgments from the EU Courts that use ³competition on the merits´ as a benchmark define 
what exactly it means.141 In fact, it is a vague concept and even if it is taken to mean competing 
on price, quality, etc., it remains without sufficient limiting principles that would distinguish it 
from competition that is not on the merits.142 This is aggravated by the fact that according to 
the Commission ³[v]igorous price competition is generally beneficial to consumers´143 This 
clearly suggests that not all price competition is acceptable, which in turn makes it more 
important to precisely define what ³competition on the merits´ refers to in order for 
undertakings to know ex ante which types of price competition do not constitute competition 
on the merits. Indeed, the EU courts have on several occasions held that not all price 
competition is legitimate.144 The problem with the case law DQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VDSSURDFK
seems to be the adoption of a piecemeal approach to competition on the merits by deciding on 
what does not constitute such competition on a case-by-case basis. In the context of unilateral 
conduct when it is not necessarily obvious from a legal or economic point of view what makes 
an otherwise normal, common business practice abusive when adopted by certain undertakings, 
using benchmarks such as ³competition on the merits´ that are not themselves self-explanatory 
is not helpful in terms of providing certainty and clarity. 
CONCLUSION 
0DUNRYLWV¶WZR-volume study into economics and the interpretation and application of US and 
EU antitrust law makes numerous significant contributions to the literature and deserves a place 
LQHYHU\DQWLWUXVWODZ\HU¶Vlibrary. There is no doubt that these contributions will lead to much 
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academic debate and commentary in the years to come, of which the current contribution may 
be seen as a starting point concerning the tests of illegality proposed by Markovits to be correct 
under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. This contribution has sought to provide a critique of these 
tests, with the hope of furthering the debate initiated by Markovits. What the study of the tests 
of illegality shows is that there is still considerable ambiguity concerning some of the most 
fundamental concepts of antitrust law at least in the EU but perhaps also in the US. The concept 
of ³competition on the merits´ is one of them but there is also significant scope for discussion 
and disagreement on what makes a conduct anticompetitive, irrespective of whether such 
conduct is of the type prohibited under Article 101 TFEU or of the type prohibited under Article 
102 TFEU. The blurred distinction between object and effect restrictions under Article 101 
TFEU; the potential perverse implications of prohibiting vertical restraints or pure intra-brand 
restrictions of competition; the somewhat half-hearted treatment of efficiencies under Article 
102 TFEU; and the use of intent as a central component of the test of illegality are some of the 
important issues that this contribution has sought to contribute to the discussion of. Irrespective 
of whether one agrees or disagrees with the propositions put forward by Markovits on these 
fundamental issues, one must acknowledge the significance and intellectual rigour of the 
contribution made to this topical debate by Markovits in his study, which will no doubt become 
one of the seminal works on EU and US antitrust law. 
